Abstract-Service quality decisions of both members in service supply chain consisting of one service integrator and one service provider with stochastic demand are investigated, wherein service integrator supervises the service quality of service provider. By considering service quality and supervision level, members' profit functions are established. Meanwhile, based on quantum game, Nash equilibrium and quantum equilibrium are used to optimize the models. The optimal service quality of two members are obtained. Finally, mathematical reasoning and numerical simulations demonstrate that (1) quantum equilibrium solutions are superior to Nash equilibrium solutions under certain condition. If entanglement degree equals to zero, equilibrium solutions of quantum game are the same as the results of Nash equilibrium. (2) Service quality of service integrator increases in entanglement degree and decreases in supervision level. (3) Service quality of service provider decreases in entanglement degree and increases in supervision level.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Chinese service industry has developed very quickly. In 2015, added value of Chinese tertiary industry was 34.1567 trillion RMB and reached 50.5% of GDP. Meanwhile, the growth of tertiary industry's added value is 8.3% faster than secondary industry (6.0%) and primary industry (3.9%). It marks China's economy officially entered 'Service Time' and means Chinese economy quickly transform from industry leading to service leading. These specific data are released from Chinese national bureau of statistics and the national economic and social development statistical bulletin in 2015. Therefore, service industry will become a new "engine" of economic growth in China. However, compared with developed countries, service quality of Chinese service industry is left behind. Consequently, service supply chain (SSC) and service quality become a hot topic in academia and business..
II. MODEL FORMULATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the case of demand uncertainty, we consider a twoechelon SSC model only containing one service integrator and one service provider. Business flow of SSC is seen in Fig. 1 . Assumption 1. To provide services for its clients, service integrator acquires primary services from service provider and sells its value-added service to the market. Hence, service quality of service integrator determines the final service quality to clients.
Assumption 2. The model assumes that in the first cooperation or early cooperation between members in SSC, both members are not well acquainted with each other. Therefore, service integrator needs to supervise service quality provided by service provider, in order to obtain desired service quality. Notations used are presented in Table 1 . We express demand function of SSC as follows: quality is relatively high, satisfaction degree of purchasers will be high, contributing to improve the image of service integrator and expand demand scale. On the contrary, when the service quality is relatively low, consumers will be dissatisfied with one sector or even the whole service quality in supply chain, bringing a certain demand loss of SSC.
We assume that primary supervision cost function of service provider is as follows 2 c T tan
Where  is the elasticity of supervision cost c T .
Meanwhile, we assume that service quality with cost of functions [1, 2] is as follow:
The profits functions of i  can be expressed by following equations: will become the penalty factor to service supply provider.
III. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT METHODS
A. NASH Equilibrium Proposition 1. In SSC, optimal service quality of service integrator and provider under Nash equilibrium are given by
Corollary 1. In Nash equilibrium,
x has no correlation with  . 
B. Quantum Game
 is known as the squeezing parameter of the pair and can be reasonably perceived as a measure of entanglement, here we suppose that  is nonnegative real numbers.
When    which is the infinite squeezing limit, the relevant pair will be approximate to the EPR state.
The basic form of entanglement operator [5] is
Using the 'momentum' operator 
So the final state is 
Then measuring corresponding service quality of two members are
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We can get 
Thus we will obtain the optimal equilibrium solutions 
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Corollary 2. We can find that equilibrium solutions of quantum game are equal to results of Nash equilibrium, if 0   . However, equilibrium solutions of quantum game are different from the results of Nash equilibrium, if . ( x of service integrator decreases in  and constantly tends to58. Hence, if service integrator takes a certain supervision level  , it is advantageous for service integrator to obtain expected service quality from service provider. Meanwhile, it is indispensable guarantee to service integrator to provide better value-added services. . When entanglement degree  is higher, supervision level  of service integrator is higher as well. Furthermore, service quality of service provider is higher. Because higher service quality will bring higher cost of service quality and influence the profit of SSC members. Consequently, in early cooperation of SSC members, an appropriate supervision level is beneficial for service provider to obtain a superior service quality. 
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A. Without Considering the Entanglement Degree

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate service quality decisions of both members in SSC including one service integrator and one services provider with stochastic demand. On the basis of Nash equilibrium and quantum game, we obtain optimal service quality and optimal profits of service provider and service integrator. Among them, quantum game combines quantum information theory and game theory together. Since quantum system has the characteristics of superposition and entanglement, when a classic game is put in the framework of quantization, a superior solution or a better utility value can often be obtained.
